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When the America Invents Act ("AIA ") was signed in September 2011,
many feared the law might benefit larger corporations at the expense of
small businesses. This Note examines how one portion of the AIA, gov-
erning joinder in patent cases, might actually benefit small businesses
by reducing patent assertions from non-practicing entities ("NPEs").
NPE assertions disproportionately affect small businesses, both be-
cause NPEs target small businesses more frequently and because pat-
ent assertions have a greater impact on individual companies. Prior to
the AIA, joining multiple defendants in a single lawsuit offered impor-
tant advantages for patent holders and allowed NPEs to achieve a
profitable economy of scale by targeting small businesses. The AIA, on
the other hand, imposes a higher standard for joinder, changing both
the litigation and economic dynamics of asserting patents against mul-
tiple defendants. Over the long run, the new joinder provision will
likely reduce patent assertions against small businesses by increasing
costs for NPEs and removing the litigation advantages of joining multi-
ple defendants. This Note will also discuss how NPEs might adapt their
assertion strategy in light of the joinder provision, as well as why some
NPEs may continue to litigate against small companies, even at a
short-term financial loss.
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INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the negative effects of non-practicing enti-
ties ("NPEs") on the technology industry.' The corporate titans of Silicon
Valley often point to the high costs of patent litigation as a tax on innovation
and criticize NPEs for hindering productive businesses and increasing prices
for consumers.2 Most often, the cases that draw media attention involve
multi-national corporations hit with hundreds of millions of dollars in dam-
ages.3 But for every multi-million dollar damage award levied against com-
panies like Microsoft or Apple, there are many more lawsuits filed against
small- and medium-sized businesses, many of which are not even involved
in the technology sector.4
With the passage of the America Invents Act ("AIA"), Congress has
implicitly addressed NPE litigation by limiting a patent holder's ability to
join multiple defendants through 35 U.S.C. § 299.1 In the AIA legislative
1. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, Tech Suits Endanger Innovation, N.Y. Timls, May 30,
2012, at B l; Richard Finger, Patent Lawsuits: The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous, FORBES
(Nov. 26, 2012, 12:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardfinger/2012/1 1/26/patent-law
suits-the-good-the-bad-and-the-frivolous/.
2. See, e.g., Kent Walker, Google: Don't Let Trolls Exploit Patent System Flaws,
WIRED (Nov. 19, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/1 1/google/ ("We must
improve our patent system to reduce the taxing effects of trolls, so companies can stop wasting
money in court and get back to doing what they do best-building the great products and
services we all enjoy.").
3. See, e.g., William M. Bulkeley, Court Play: Aggressive Patent Litigants Pose
Growing Threat to Big Business, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2005, at Al; Barrie McKenna et al.,
Patently Absurd: The Inside Story of RIM's Wireless War, Gioim & MAIL, Jan. 28, 2006, at
B4; Declan McCullagh, Apple Loses Bid to Nix Patent Troll's 'Screen Rotation' Suit, CNET
Nnws (Nov. 9, 2012, 4:57 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-57548040-37/apple-
loses-bid-to-nix-patent-trolls-screen-rotation-suit/.
4. Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls 4-5 (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Accepted Paper No. 09-12, 2012) [hereinafter Startups], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=2146251 (finding that 66% of NPE de-
fendants are companies with less than $100 million in annual revenue, and 55% of defendants
have less than $10 million in revenue).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2011).
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history, Congress specifically states that the purpose of the provision was to
address the scenario in which defendants with tenuous connections to the
underlying disputes are joined by the dozens,6 a common strategy for NPEs.'
While § 299 effectively limits joinder in patent cases, it is unclear if the new
provision has actually reduced the total number of NPE lawsuits.' Thus far,
studies of the AIA have looked at NPE litigation in the aggregate, without
accounting for how the provisions of the AIA might affect the distributional
impact of NPE litigation.9 To address this gap, this Note analyzes how the
AIA joinder provision will affect small businesses. In the long run, § 299
will likely reduce NPE assertions against small businesses by increasing the
cost of enforcing patents against multiple alleged infringers and by removing
strategic advantages of joining multiple defendants.
Section I of this Note looks at the NPE business model and investigates
how the economics of patent litigation drive NPEs to consolidate their trials.
Section II explains why allowing NPEs to consolidate trials disproportion-
ately impacts small businesses. Section III examines the mechanics of con-
solidating trials before and after the AIA. Section IV highlights the NPE
response to § 299 and analyzes how that response will affect small busi-
nesses. Finally, Section V explores why some NPEs may continue targeting
small businesses to strengthen their future litigation position and drive up
royalty rates for their patents. The Conclusion looks at the broader policies
of patent litigation reform and promoting small business growth.
I. THE NPE BUSINESS MODEL
In general, the term NPE refers to any patent-holding individual or or-
ganization that does not practice the invention, but instead licenses or asserts
its patents to generate revenue."' The term may describe universities, re-
search organizations, or other licensing entities." There is a subset of NPEs,
sometimes called patent assertion entities, which use patent licenses and
6. H.R. Ri~r. No. 112-98, at 54 (2011) (addressing problems occasioned by the joinder
of defendants who have tenuous connections to the underlying disputes in patent infringement
suits).
7. Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25
HARV. .L. & TECH. 687, 691-92 (2012).
8. Patent Reform and the Law of Unintended Consequences, RPX, http://www.rpx
corp.com/index.cfm?pageid=14&itemid=17 (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
9. Bryant, supra note 7; Patent Reform, supra note 8.
10. See, e.g., Taurus IP v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 519 F. Supp. 2d 905, 911 (W.D. Wis.
2007) ("[Non-practicing entities] do not manufacture products, but instead hold licenses to
numerous patents, which they license and enforce against alleged infringers."); James F. Mc-
Donough 111, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent
Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 192-93 (2006) (explaining the business
model of NPEs).
I1. John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 Tix. L. Ry. 2111, 2117
(2007).
491Spring 2013]
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 19:489
damage awards as their only revenue source.12 These entities are also re-
ferred to as "patent trolls" because they characteristically hold patents until a
related product becomes profitable, then emerge to demand payments from
unsuspecting companies," much like the trolls of folklore that ambush un-
suspecting passersby.14 For the purposes of the following discussion, the
term NPE will be limited to these patent assertion entities.
The total private and social impact of NPEs remains unclear.' While
there are numerous examples of NPEs that have received astronomical dam-
age awards,' 6 most NPE lawsuits end with settlements that are not made
public.' 7 By analyzing changes in market capitalization following patent
lawsuits, Bessen et al. estimated that the aggregate loss of wealth from NPE
lawsuits is approximately $83 million per year." In terms of prevalence,
NPE-initiated patent lawsuits are still less common than patent lawsuits
among practicing entities.'9 In one study, Sannu K. Shrestha estimated the
percentage of NPE-initiated lawsuits to be anywhere between 2% to 17% of
all patent lawsuits. 201
As with any other business, NPEs must generate more revenue than
costs incurred to stay in business. Damage awards and settlement-induced
licenses are NPEs' only source of revenue. 21 This business model depends
on three main factors: (1) revenue generated from defendants, (2) the cost of
litigation, and (3) the likelihood of a favorable outcome.
Regarding the first factor, it is difficult to estimate how much revenue a
patent holder can expect to earn from asserting their patent, since this
12. Id. at 2112.
13. McDonough, supra note 10.
14. PAUL GALDONE, THF THREE BiU.Y GOATs GRuFF 9 (1973).
15. Sannu K. Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Non-
practicing Entities, 110 CoituM. L. Ruv. 114, 120-21 (2010) ("[l~t is unclear whether NPE-
initiated suits are indeed significant enough to have an impact on the costs of most products.").
16. In one of the most noted patent infringement cases, the patent holding company
NTP sued Blackberry maker Research in Motion ("RIM") and was awarded an injunction in
addition to $53 million in damages. After losing on appeal, RIM ultimately licensed the patent
for $612.5 million from NTP. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1287
(Fed. Cir. 2005); accord Shrestha, supra note 15, at 114.
17. From Exposing NPE Myths to Explaining NPE Math, RPX, http://www.rpxcorp.
com/index.cfm?pageid=14&itemid=25 (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (noting that 95% of cases
brought by NPEs are settled).
18. James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Cost of Patent Trolls (Bos. Univ. Sch.
of Law, Working Paper No. 11-45, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id= 1930272.
19. Shrestha, supra note 15, at 120-21.
20. Id.
21. Taurus IP v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 519 F. Supp. 2d 905, 911 (W.D. Wis. 2007)
("[NPEs] do not manufacture products, but instead hold licenses to numerous patents, which
they license and enforce against alleged infringers.").
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amount varies greatly based on the industry and size of defendant. 22 For
example, median damage awards in the consumer products industry are well
below $5 million, while median damage awards in the electronics industry
run above $30 million. 23 Across all industries, the median damage award of
NPE-initiated lawsuits from 1995 to 2011 was approximately $6.9 million.2 4
While the median damage award illustrates the magnitude of NPE damages,
the reported median only reflects NPE lawsuits that resulted in a verdict. The
vast majority of NPE assertions end with settlement agreements that are not
public. 25 In fact, several studies have found that fewer than 5% of patent
infringement cases are resolved through trial. 26
Turning to the second factor-cost of litigation-there are various esti-
mates for how much money an NPE needs to launch a lawsuit. In general,
legal fees often exceed $4 million to take a patent case through trial.2 7 Other
studies estimate that NPEs will require approximately $2 million to launch a
patent infringement lawsuit. 28 While these legal fees may seem prohibitively
high, the up-front costs for NPEs tend to be very low because many rely on
law firms that accept contingency fee arrangements. 29 By comparing the me-
dian damage award to the cost of litigation, it is evident that relatively few
cases will result in huge windfalls for NPEs.
The third and final factor in the NPE business model is the likelihood of
a favorable outcome. PricewaterhouseCoopers found that NPEs had an over-
all success rate of 24.3% between 2006 and 2011.30 This study is consistent
with data acquired from the Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse,3 ' which
22. PRIcowA'nm RHOUSE-COOPEI3Rs, 2012 PATENT LnIGATrION STUDY 16 (2012), available
at http://www.pwc.com/enUS/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2012-patent-litigation-
study.pdf [hereinafter PATENT LITIGATION STuDY].
23. Id.
24. Id. at 7; Matthew Fawcett & Jeremiah Chan, March of the Trolls: Footsteps Getting
Louder, 13 INTLL. PRoP. L. Buiu. 1, 8 (2008).
25. Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HA-LL L. REV. 457, 481 (2012); From
Exposing NPE Myths to Explaining NPE Math, RPX, http://www.rpxcorp.com/index.cfm?
pageid=14&itemid=25 (noting that, based on data in Risch's empirical study, 95% of cases
brought by NPEs are settled).
26. Id.; see also Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls:
Strategic Behavior by Individual Inventors, Small Firms, and Entrepreneurs in Patent Litiga-
tion (111. Law & Econ. Papers Series, No. LEO9-05, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1337166.
27. Risch, supra note 25, at 467.
28. Shrestha, supra note 15, at 120.
29. In a contingency fee arrangement, the legal counsel is paid after the lawsuit has
been resolved by receiving a portion of any damage award or settlement payment. David L.
Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. RIEv.
335, 335 (2012).
30. PATENT LrrIGATION Sruny, supra note 22, at 12.
31. The Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse is a database of all patent infringement
lawsuits filed from January 1, 2000, to the present. Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse,
STANFORo LAW Sc., http://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programs-and-centers/stan
ford-ip-litigation-clearinghouse (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
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estimated the success rate of NPE-initiated patent litigation cases to be
around 24.1% from 2000 to 2008.32 Thus, given the high cost of litigation
and relatively low rate of success, NPEs and their law firms take on substan-
tial risk in litigating a case to trial.33 To compensate for this risk dynamic,
NPEs will file lawsuits against deep-pocketed companies for tens of millions
in damages or, alternatively, target a large number of companies to extract
smaller settlement payments or damage awards.34
II. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF NPE LITIGATION ON SMALL BUSINESSES
While NPEs assert patents against defendants of all sizes, NPE asser-
tions against small companies warrant particular attention for two reasons.
First, small businesses suffer greater direct impact from patent lawsuits be-
cause they pay more litigation costs relative to their size.35 Moreover, the
time and effort devoted to patent litigation detracts significantly from routine
business operations and may hamper long-term growth.3 6
Second, small businesses constitute the majority of defendants in NPE
litigation. Based on the RPX database, 37 Bessen and Meurer estimate that the
median-sized defendant in an NPE lawsuit has $10.8 million in annual reve-
nue.38 Similarly, Colleen Chien reports that 66% of defendants have less
than $100 million in annual revenue, and 55% have less than $10 million.39
The sheer number of alleged infringers also distinguishes assertions against
small companies. 40 It is common for NPEs to target dozens, if not hundreds,
of small businesses based on a few patents. 41 In a sense, the two factors are
intertwined since NPEs are more likely to target small businesses precisely
because small companies are more vulnerable to lawsuits. 42 Given their rela-
32. Shrestha, supra note 15, at 158.
33. The risk of losing cases runs to the law firms that represent NPEs as well, since
many NPEs rely on law firms that operate on contingency fees. Schwartz, supra note 29, at
335; see also Shrestha, supra note 15, at 120 ("Given the enormous cost of litigating infringe-
ment suits, it is doubtful whether a rational NPE, or a contingency fee attorney, would sue a
defendant if there was a low probability of a positive outcome.").
34. James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes 13
(Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 12-34, 2012), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2091210.
35. Id.
36. Startups, supra note 4, at 4-5.
37. The RPX corporation is a defensive patent aggregator that holds over 2,900 patents.
Overview, RPX, http://www.rpxcorp.com/index.cfm?pageid=17 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
38. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 34, at 2.
39. Startups, supra note 4, at 4-5.
40. For example, Innovatio IP Ventures has sent over 8,000 demand letters to small
businesses that provide wireless internet service. See also Startups, supra note 4, at 15.
41. Id.
42. Startups, supra note 4, at 4 (finding that small companies often cannot pay mone-
tary damages); cf Bessen & Meurer, supra note 34, at 15 (finding that NPEs are willing to file
many lawsuits to extract small payments).
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tive lack of financial resources to litigate a patent, small companies are more
likely to settle with an NPE regardless of the merits of the claim. 4 3
A. Direct Impact of NPE Assertions Against Small Companies
Not only do small companies bear the brunt of NPE assertions, but pat-
ent litigation also has a greater detrimental impact on small companies for
two main reasons." First, small companies have comparably fewer resources
to defend against allegations of patent infringement. 45 Bessen and Meurer
estimate that the median cost of litigation for a small- or medium-sized com-
pany is around half a million dollars. 4 6 For defendants who earn less than
$10 million in total revenue,47 spending hundreds of thousands of dollars on
a lawsuit can be crippling. In some cases, even successful defendants have
found that the time and money devoted to patent litigation has destroyed
their competitive edge, leaving them with a Pyrrhic victory. 48 In light of
these costs, small businesses are likely to settle with NPEs or resort to tactics
such as "life-support," in which defendants file the minimum amount of
work necessary to prevent a default judgment. 49
Second, NPE lawsuits have a greater operational impact on small com-
panies. In one survey of companies that received NPE demands, over half of
companies with less than $1 million in revenue reported that the NPE asser-
tions have forced them to change their business strategy, delay hiring, and
make other significant operational changes."o Conversely, no business with
revenues over $100 million reported any significant operational impact.5 '
NPEs tend to hit start-up companies especially hard,52 as early stage busi-
nesses often need several rounds of financing before they become profita-
43. Startups, supra note 4, at 4.
44. Carl Shapiro, Patent Assertion Entities, Effective Monetizes, Tax on Innovation, or
Both? 16, U.S. Dir' r oi JusriCE (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/work
shops/pae/presentations/290074.pdf (finding that NPEs are more likely than practicing entities
to target small companies).
45. Startups, supra note 4, at 1.
46. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 34, at 12.
47. Startups, supra note 4, at 4-5.
48. C. Douhigg & S. Lohr, Patent Wars Among Tech Giants Can Stifle Competition,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, at Al (discussing the case of Vlingo, a voice-recognition software
firm that successfully defended a lawsuit for patent infringement, but devoted so much time
and money that it was ultimately forced to sell the firm to a competitor).
49. Startups, supra note 4, at II ("'[Life support,' . . . [is] to do the least that is
required to avoid defaulting on the case and hope that larger companies with deeper pockets
will take the lead.").
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id.
52. Sarah McBride, US Patent Lawsuits Now Dominated by 'Trolls' -Study, RFuTns
(Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/201 2 /12/10/patents-usa-lawsuits-idUSLIE8N
A55M20121210 ("35 percent of startups that have raised $50 million to $100 million have
been sued on a patent ... as have 20 percent of the companies that have raised $20 million to
$50 million.").
495Spring 2013]
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 19:489
ble.5 1 For example, Union Square Ventures, a New York-based venture
capital fund, reports that almost one-third of the companies in its investment
portfolio is facing patent assertions from NPEs.5 4 Investors, including ven-
ture capital firms, tend to favor companies with lower risk 5 and will often
avoid companies caught in patent litigation. 6 The clean energy sector, which
includes many growth-stage companies, has been particularly affected by
NPE activity.5 7 CleanTech PatentEdge, an IP analytics firm for the clean
energy sector,58 reports that NPEs own over 1,200 patents related to clean
energy technology. 9 Many of these patents have been asserted against clean
energy companies such as LED manufacturers and smart electric grid
producers. 601
B. NPEs Target Large Numbers of Small Businesses
NPE assertions against small companies do not depend on extracting
large damage awards or settlements;6 ' instead, their strategy depends on vol-
ume.62 In general, small businesses settle NPE assertions for substantially
53. A. Davila et al., Venture Capital Financing and the Growth of Startup Firms, 18 J.
Bus. VENTURING 689, 697 (2003).
54. Brad Burnham, We Need an Independent Invention Defense to Minimize the Dam-
age of Aggressive Patent Trolls, UNION SQUARE VENTURES (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.usv.
com/2010/01/we-need-an-independent-invention-defense-to-minimize-the-damage-of-aggres
sive-patent-trolls.php.
55. See Startups, supra note 4, at 13; see also John Hall & Charles W. Hofer, Venture
Capitalists' Decision Criteria in New Venture Evaluation, 8 J. Bus. VENTURING 25, 38-39
(1993).
56. Startups, supra note 4, at 13 ("Pre-A round companies are really [ ][s** out of luck].
It's really a big problem. They can't raise financing to defend the case. No one wants to fund
an untested company. A piece of the funds, management time are [sic] bled out to lawyers.
They can go out of business over [these kinds of suits].").
57. See also Eric L. Lane, Keeping the LEDs on and the Electric Motors Running:
Clean Tech in Court After eBay, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 1-3 (2010).
58. See Company Overview, CuEANTECH PATENTEDGE, http://www.cleantechpatent
edge.com/about (last visited Feb. 12, 2013).
59. Kathryn Paisner, Non-Practicing Entities in Cleantech, CLEANTECH PATENTEDGE
(Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.cleantechpatentedge.com/2012/10/non-practicing-entities-in-clean
tech.
60. Id.
61. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 34, at 15 ("Plaintiffs using this tactic are willing to
settle for small payments, often no more than the amount a defendant would spend on legal
fees to defend the case. As one such plaintiff lawyer put it, 'An NPE intuitively understands
that we could go for triples or home runs, but we can also go for singles and get a good return
and work on other things.'").
62. Ray Niro, who represents many NPEs at the law firm of Niro & Niro, discussed a
subset of NPEs that target multiple defendants during an interview with IPwatchdog.com. Spe-
cifically, Mr. Niro stated that "they're not as selective in what and how they enforce -they're
playing a numbers game. They don't really care whether they win, lose, or draw, they get some
lawyers to represent them and if I bring ten lawsuits and one turns out to be okay, that's good
for me." Gene Quinn, An Exclusive Interview with Ray Niro, Mr. Patent Litigtion, IP WATCH-
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lower amounts than large companies. 63 Bessen and Meurer found that the
mean settlement amount-including damage awards-was $1.33 million for
small- and medium-sized companies, in contrast to $7.27 million for large
companies.6 Given the lower damage awards, NPEs hope to turn a profit by
obtaining small settlements or damage amounts from many small business
defendants. As such, NPEs that assert patents against small companies will
often send demand letters to large numbers of alleged infringers with the aim
of extracting a modest amount from each target.6 5
The most notable example of this tactic is Innovatio's lawsuits against
businesses that provide wireless Internet service. 66 Innovatio IP Ventures
was formed by Noel Whitley, a former Broadcom executive,67 and holds a
number of patents on wireless network technology acquired from
Broadcom.68 Since 2011, Innovatio has sent over eight thousand demand
letters to retail outlets, retirement homes, hotels, coffee shops, and other
businesses that provide wireless Internet to their customers, alleging that
their wireless routers infringe Innovatio's patents. 69 These demand letters
generally included an offer to license the patents for several thousand dol-
lars,7o a relatively small amount in patent litigation. In the Northern District
of Illinois alone, Innovatio filed lawsuits against hundreds of alleged infring-
ers, often joining dozens of defendants in one lawsuit.7 1
Another example concerns Project Paperless, an NPE that owns two pat-
ents for scan-to-email technology.72 Rather than targeting manufacturers
such as Xerox, Canon, or Hewlett Packard, Project Paperless launched a
campaign against small companies that use commercial digital scanners in
DOG (Mar. 18, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/18/an-exclusive-inter
view-with-ray-niro-mr-patent-litigation/id=22872/.
63. Bessen et al., supra note 18, at 12-13.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 15.
66. See AH&LA Statement on Innovatio (Patent Troll), AM. Horst & LODGINc, ASs'N,
http://www.ahla.com/PressRoom.aspx?id=33218 (last visited Feb. 12, 2013).
67. Broadcom is one of the largest semi-conductor manufacturers in the world, report-
ing $8.01 billion in revenue in 2012. Facts at a Glance, BRoADCM CORP., http://www.broad
com.com/docs/company/BroadcomQuickFacts.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
68. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint at 13, In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Li-
tig., No. 11-9308, 2013 WL 427167 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2012).
69. Id. at 9.
70. Id. at 10-11.
71. See, e.g., Complaint for Patent Infringement, Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC v. ABP
Corp., No. 11-1638 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2011); Original Complaint for Patent Infringement, In-
novatio IP Ventures, LLC v. Best W. River N. Hotel, L.L.C., No. 11-4668 (N.D. Ill. July 11,
2011).
72. Complaint for Patent Infringement, Project Paperless, LLC v. Veris Consulting,
Inc., No. 12-34, 2012 WL 1197546 (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2012); Complaint for Patent Infringe-
ment, Project Paperless LLC. v. UAV Communications, Inc., No. 12-39, 2012 WL 271094
(E.D. Va. Jan. 18, 2012).
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day-to-day operations. 73 In one lawsuit against an Atlanta-based IT manage-
ment firm, Project Paperless alleged damages of around one to two hundred
thousand dollars. 74
As a final illustration, Acacia Media Technologies, a well-known
NPE, 5 filed a lawsuit naming over fifty alleged infringers, most of which
operated adult entertainment websites. 76 While Acacia may have selected an
unlikely target for patent litigation, their strategy is paradigmatic. Acacia
allegedly launched a plan that targeted small firms first and tried to convince
them to settle. Accordingly, "[bly selecting fragmented markets rather than
going after big players like MSN or AOL, Acacia hoped to avoid getting
embroiled in a debilitating legal battle."7 7
C. Implications of NPE Assertions Against Small Businesses
These cases illustrate an important point about NPE assertions, which is
that NPEs will often have the ability to select defendants from a variety of
potential infringers. Under 35 U.S.C. § 271, "whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the
patent" and is liable for patent infringement.7 1 In the modem stream of com-
merce, products travel from manufacturers to distributors and retailers
before they ultimately reach end-users. Any company in this chain of com-
merce could be held liable for patent infringement.79 For example, Innovatio
had the option of suing large wireless router manufacturers such as Cisco or
73. Startups, supra note 4, at 4-5; see, e.g., Third Party Complaint, Project Paperless
LLC v. Bluewave Computing LLC, No. 1:12-cv-00995-SCJ (N.D. Ga. July 10, 2012), 2012
WL 3992461; Complaint, Project Paperless, LLC v. Veris Consulting, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-
00334-AJT-TRJ (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2012), 2012 WL 1197546.
74. Third Party Complaint, Project Paperless LLC v. Bluewave Computing LLC, No.
1:12-cv-00995-SCJ (N.D. Ga. July 10, 2012), 2012 WL 3992461 ("Project Paperless claims it
is entitled to royalties for BlueWave's alleged use of the Patents in Suit in excess of
$100,000."); see also Small Business Beats Patent Troll at Its Own Game, PRWEm (Aug. 6,
2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/8/prweb9766179.htm ("[fin BlueWave's case,
Project Paperless initially demanded over $100,000 to settle. They even offered payment terms
spread out over several years.").
75. Rachael King, Acacia: The Company Tech Loves to Hate, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS-
WEEK (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2010-02-01/acacia-the-company-
tech-loves-to-hatebusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice.
76. In re Acacia Media Technologies Corp., No. C 05-01114 JW, 2005 WL 1683660, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2005).
77. Id.
78. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2011).
79. Patent Claims Against Retailers 2, MORGAN LEWIS & Bocilus LLP (Sept. 2010),
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/IP-PatentClaimsAgainstRetailersWPSept2OlO.pdf
("The reason for this-and the single most important issue to keep in mind-is that U.S. laws
impose liability for infringing a patent by making, using, or selling (or even offering to sell)
the patented invention. Furthermore, patent infringement is a strict liability cause of action. In
other words, it does not matter to the courts whether the retailer should have-or even could
have-known of the asserted patent.").
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Netgear.80 Instead, Innovatio targeted thousands of small companies that
purchased the routers and used them in their daily business operations.8 '
Likewise, Project Paperless asserted its patents against end-users of digital
scanners rather than companies that actually designed and sold the accused
products. 8 2 Legally, a claim of patent infringement is no less valid because it
is asserted against a small company that unknowingly uses an infringing
technology product."3 The plain language of § 271 clearly states that any
company that uses or sells a patented invention is liable for patent infringe-
ment,84 and patent law does not recognize an innocent use defense.85
For some NPEs, targeting small businesses instead of large corporations
offers direct financial rewards as well as strategic benefits. 8 6 As previously
discussed, small companies are more vulnerable to the costs of litigation and
thus will often settle a patent claim regardless of the merits. 7 By launching a
campaign against a large number of small companies, NPEs can quickly
collect settlement payments from multiple alleged infringers." Furthermore,
license terms for a patent can be used in subsequent litigation to establish a
reasonable royalty rate for damage calculations." As a result, NPEs may
also target small companies to strengthen their position in future infringe-
ment claims by establishing a favorable royalty rate for their patents.
While patent law allows NPEs to selectively target small companies,
public policy should divert litigation away from small companies given their
important role in the U.S. economy. According to the Small Business Ad-
ministration, small businesses generated 65% of new jobs in the last seven-
80. Complaint for Patent Infringement, Project Paperless, LLC v. Veris Consulting,
Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00334-AJT-TRJ (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2012), 2012 WL 1197546; Complaint
for Patent Infringement, Project Paperless LLC. v. UAV Communications, Inc., 3:12-cv-
00039-REP (E.D. Va. Jan. 18, 2012), 2012 WL 271094.
81. Id.
82. Startups, supra note 4, at 4-5; see, e.g., Third Party Complaint, Project Paperless
LLC v. Bluewave Computing LLC, No. 1:12-cv-00995-SCJ (N.D. Ga. July 10, 2012), 2012
WL 3992461; Complaint for Patent Infringement, Project Paperless, LLC v. Veris Consulting,
Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00334-AJT-TRJ (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2012), 2012 WL 1197546.
83. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent
Law, 17 BERKli.xY TiECH. L.J. 799, 800-01 (2002) ("Patent infringement is a strict liability tort
in the sense that a defendant may be liable without having had any notice, prior to the filing of
an infringement action, that her conduct was infringing. In other words, innocent (i.e., uninten-
tional or inadvertent) infringement is not a defense to a patent infringement claim, and a court
usually will enjoin the defendant from infringing even though she was put on notice only by
the filing of the lawsuit.").
84. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2011).
85. Blair & Cotter, supra note 83, at 800-01.
86. Startups, supra note 4, at 15.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id. at 15.
89. Parker Kuhl, Rescue Me!: The Attack on Settlement Negotiations After Resqnet v.
Lansa, 26 BIERKlELEY TECH. L.J. 269, 271 (2011); see infra Section IV.B.
499Spring 2013]1
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 19:489
teen years and employ half of all private sector employees.90 Furthermore, a
system that creates incentives for patentees to litigate against small compa-
nies appears to contradict Congress's stated policy of fostering small busi-
ness growth and development.91
To some extent, the addition of 35 U.S.C. § 299 may address this impor-
tant policy goal by making it more difficult to simultaneously litigate against
multiple defendants. 92 While there is no legislative history to suggest that
Congress drafted § 299 for the benefit of small businesses, the law inadver-
tently helps small businesses by making it more difficult for patent holders
to join dozens of small businesses in one lawsuit.
III. THE MECHANICS OF JOINDER AND 35 U.S.C. § 299
Sections I and II examined how the economics of NPE assertions lead to
patent assertions against large numbers of small businesses. When patent
assertions turn into patent lawsuits, NPEs will often consolidate alleged in-
fringers into as few trials as possible.93 Joining multiple defendants offers
several important advantages for NPEs, especially those that assert patents
against small businesses. First, NPEs avoid the cost of litigating against each
defendant separately. Given the high cost of patent litigation, the economies
of scale achieved by consolidation are crucial for NPEs that target small
businesses. 94 From the NPE's perspective, joining additional defendants in a
single action increases potential revenue without a corresponding cost
increase.
90. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., http://web.sba.gov/faqs/
faqlndexAll.cfm?areaid=24 (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 631a (2011) ("For the purpose of preserving and promoting a competi-
tive free enterprise economic system, Congress hereby declares that it is the continuing policy
and responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practical means and to take such ac-
tions as are necessary . . . in order to: foster the economic interests of small businesses; insure
a competitive economic climate conducive to the development, growth and expansion of small
businesses; establish incentives to assure that adequate capital and other resources at competi-
tive prices are available to small businesses; reduce the concentration of economic resources
and expand competition; and provide an opportunity for entrepreneurship, inventiveness, and
the creation and growth of small businesses.").
92. 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2011).
93. Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 687, 691 (2012) ("Patent trolls commonly rely on the litigation strategy of
joining multiple, unrelated defendants in the same patent infringement suit ..... ); see also
Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the
Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. Riv. 1571, 1572 (2009).
94. Cf Donald R. Banowit et al., AIA Effects on Parallel Section 337 Practice-Joinder
Under the AIA, in 2 PATENT OFFIcE LIIGATION § 17:14 (2012) (discussing how patent holders
will be deterred from separately enforcing their patent against individual defendants if the
anticipated recovery is not significant).
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Second, by joining a large numbers of defendants, NPEs can hale more
small businesses into court and make the threat of litigation more realistic.95
NPEs launch assertion campaigns by sending demand letters to numerous
companies. 96 These letters usually allege infringement of one or more pat-
ents and include an offer to license the asserted patents for a fee.9 7 The bar-
gaining position of NPEs ultimately depends on their ability to launch a
costly lawsuit if the alleged infringer refuses to pay the license fee.98 While
receiving a demand letter may be intimidating, one in five start-up compa-
nies reported that they simply ignored the letter,99 suggesting that some com-
panies realize that many NPEs are simply seeking a quick settlement
payment rather than protracted legal battles.'" In colloquial terms, some
small companies are "calling the bluff' because they know that NPEs are
unlikely to follow through on all of their demand letters.' 0
Consolidating trials also offers important litigation advantages. By join-
ing geographically diverse defendants in a favorable jurisdiction, NPEs re-
duce the likelihood that a defendant can transfer the case to another
95. There is an underlying question of whether NPEs that send demand letters to small
companies actually have valid claims for infringement, or if they are making meritless de-
mands to intimidate small businesses into settlements. NPEs could be conceivably asserting
weaker claims against small businesses because they believe small businesses are more likely
to settle frivolous lawsuits. Regardless, it is important to examine the economic and strategic
reasons for targeting small businesses instead of large companies, irrespective of the merits of
the claims.
96. Quinn Emmanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Best Practices for Defending Against
Patent Trolls, JDSUPRA (July 26, 2011), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/best-practices-for-
defending-against-pat-72782/; Christopher T. Vrountas & Richard S. Loftus, Escaping the
Snare of the Patent Troll's Net, NiLSON KINDER & MOSsEAU P.C., http://www.nkms.com/
resources/index.php?n=186 (last visited Feb. 12, 2013) ("Upon assembling its patent portfolio,
the troll will send out demand letters to a host of businesses, alleging that they may be infring-
ing on the troll's patents. Often, these demand letters are short on specifics, make very broad
claims, and are accompanied by an offer to reach a "reasonable" agreement with the business,
which typically includes a "reasonable" licensing fee in the form of either monthly payments
or a lump sum amount.").
97. Quinn Emmanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, supra note 96.
98. Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Pat-
ent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 166 (2006) ("Finally, a
patent troll makes heavy use of the threat of litigation-and the threat of an injunction-to
force a license of its patent. In order to make that threat a viable one, patent trolls often do, in
fact, engage in litigation to enforce their patent. Without the ability to enforce their patent, a
patent troll simply has an expensive piece of paper.").
99. See Startups, supra note 4, at 10.
100. See, e.g., In re Acacia Media Techs. Corp., 2005 WL 1683660, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July
19, 2005) (describing Acacia's strategy of seeking settlements from small companies, while
avoiding legal battles with more established companies).
101. Cf Startups, supra note 4, at 7 (suggesting that ignoring a demand letter may some-
times be the best strategy in responding to an NPE assertion). But see Quinn Emmanuel Ur-
quhart & Sullivan, supra note 96, at I (advising against ignoring demand letters because it
makes the defendant appear callous about the alleged infringement if the patent assertion does
result in litigation).
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jurisdiction, since there will be no district that is convenient for all the joined
defendants."' 2 Furthermore, joining multiple defendants lowers the risk of an
invalidity finding.103 Alleged infringers will often defend against a lawsuit
by invalidating the asserted patents.'0 Once a patent is declared invalid, the
patentee is estopped from asserting it against other alleged infringers."" By
consolidating its cases, the NPE reduces the number of times that a court
will examine the patent's validity, thereby reducing the likelihood that its
patent will be declared invalid.
Prior to the AIA, a minority of jurisdictions held that a patent holder
could join defendants under Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure by simply asserting that all the defendants infringed the same patents. 06
The AIA joinder provision expressly prohibits this practice'07 and effectively
forces NPEs to litigate against most companies individually. Under the new
provision, the prospect of litigating against each small business defendant
separately will likely dissuade many NPEs from launching campaigns target-
ing small companies. The remainder of this Section will compare the availa-
ble joinder procedures both before and after the AIA and will discuss the
practical implications of the new Act.
A. Joining Alleged Infringers Before the AIA
Before the AIA, district courts interpreted the standard for joinder in
patent cases inconsistently. 08 Under Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, defendants may be joined if the claims arise "(i) out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (ii) any
question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action." 09
Most courts have interpreted Rule 20 as a two-pronged test that requires
claims to (1) arise out of the same transaction or occurrence and (2) present
common questions of law or facts.110 In patent cases, alleged infringement of
the same patents may present similar issues of law or fact, but may not
102. See Bryant, supra note 7, at 691-92.
103. Id. at 704 ("If a patent troll files separate suits against multiple defendants claiming
infringement of the same patent, one of the defenses that many, if not all, of the defendants
will raise is that the patent is invalid. As follows from the Due Process Clause, a later defen-
dant is not precluded from arguing that a patent is invalid, notwithstanding a prior finding,
involving an unrelated defendant, that a patent is valid."); see also A.J. Davis & K. Jesien, The
Balance of Power in Patent Law: Moving Towards Effectiveness in Addressing Patent Troll
Concerns, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & EN. L.J. 835, 850 (2012).
104. Bryant, supra note 7, at 704.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455, 456 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
107. 35 U.S.C. § 299(b) (2011).
108. Bryant, supra note 7, at 696-97.
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
110. Bryant, supra note 7, at 696-97.
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constitute claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence."' For
example, in Philips Electronics v. Contec, Phillips joined four companies
manufacturing remote control units that allegedly infringed its patents." 2
One of the defendants, CMT, moved to sever the trial, arguing that it pro-
duced the remote controls in a different factory and did not have a business
relationship with the other defendants. The court found that the only com-
monality between CMT and other alleged infringers was that they allegedly
infringed the same patents, "which is an insufficient basis to join unrelated
parties as defendants in the same lawsuit."" The district court did not artic-
ulate a specific standard for joinder, but implied that defendants could be
joined if they produced the same product and shared some form of business
relationship.'14
While most jurisdictions required the alleged infringement to arise from
the same transaction or occurrence, a minority of jurisdictions-most nota-
bly, the Eastern District of Texas-combined the two prongs of analysis
under Rule 20(a). In MyMail v. America Online, the Eastern District of
Texas denied America Online's Rule 21 motion to sever the defendants.'"
MyMail sued seven Internet service providers based on a single method pat-
ent for accessing a computer network." 6 One defendant moved to sever the
claims, citing Phillips Electronic, among other cases," 7 to support the pro-
position that "acts of infringement by separate defendants do not satisfy the
same transaction requirement.""" The court, however, rejected this proposi-
tion and reasoned that the "same transaction or occurrence" requirement is
satisfied if "there is some connection or logical relationship between the
various transactions or occurrences," clarifying that "[a] logical relationship
exists if there is some nucleus of operative facts or law."" 9 From this read-
ing of Rule 20(a), the court held that alleged infringement of the same patent
raises common legal questions, such as claim scope, and constitutes a suffi-
cient basis to join multiple defendants.12( A number of jurisdictions adopted
Ill. Rudd v. Lux Prods. Corp., No. 09-CV-6957, 2011 WL 148052 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12,
2011); Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (N.D. 111. 1998);
Magnavox Co. v. APF Electronics, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 29, 34 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
112. Philips Electronics N. Am. Corp. v. Contec Corp., 220 F.R.D. 415, 417 (D. Del.
2004) ("Allegations of infringement against two unrelated parties based on different acts do
not arise from the same transaction.").
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Fic. R. Civ. P. 21 (stating in part that "[o]n motion or on its own, the court may at
any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a
party"); MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455, 456 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
116. Id. at 455.
117. Id. at 455 n.I.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 455-56.
120. Id. In another example, the Eastern District of Texas found that when a plaintiff
alleges that multiple defendants have infringed the same patents, "there will be significant
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the MyMail interpretation of Rule 20(a), including the District of Kansas,121
the Northern District of Texas,12 2 and the Eastern District of Louisiana.123
While only a minority of districts followed MyMail, the broad reach of
personal jurisdiction in patent cases allows NPEs to forum shop exten-
sively.124 For example, small companies that sell products through the In-
ternet are often subject to jurisdiction in faraway and patentee friendly
districts.125 Given the inconsistent interpretations of Rule 20(a) prior to the
AIA, NPEs could often avoid the higher standard for joinder by suing de-
fendants in districts that joined defendants based solely on commonly in-
fringed patents.12 6
B. Joining Alleged Infringers After the AIA
To introduce a uniform standard,127 Congress drafted a new joinder pro-
vision for patent cases in § 19 of the AIA, which came into effect as 35
U.S.C. § 299 on September 16, 2011.128 Section 299 largely tracks the lan-
guage of Rule 20(a) and states that accused patent infringers may be joined
only if the claims arise out of the same transaction and occurrence relating to
the making, using, importing, or selling of the same accused product and that
questions of fact are common to all defendants.129 More importantly, 35
U.S.C. § 299(b) specifically provides that "accused infringers may not be
joined in one action as defendants . . . based solely on allegations that they
each have infringed the patent or patents in suit." 30 The legislative history of
the AIA reveals that Congress intended to abrogate the MyMail line of
overlap among the issues of claim validity, claim construction, and claim scope. Severance and
transfer would create duplicative proceedings on the same patents, unnecessarily wasting judi-
cial resources." Innovative Global Sys. LLC v. Tpk. Global Techs. L.L.C., 6:09-CV-157, 2009
WL 3754886 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2009).
121. Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Theglobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615 (D. Kan. 2006).
122. Mannatech, Inc. v. Country Life, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-533-O, 2010 WL 2944574
(N.D. Tex. July 26, 2010).
123. Alford Safety Servs., Inc. v. Hot-Hed, Inc., No. 10-1319, 2010 WL 3418233 (E.D.
La. Aug. 24, 2010).
124. Adam D. Kline, Any Given Forum: A Proposed Solution to the Inequitable Eco-
nomic Advantage that Arises when Non-Practicing Patent Holding Organizations Predeter-
mine Forum, 48 IDEA 247, 273 (2008).
125. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(finding that website operator with subscribers in Pennsylvania was subject to personal juris-
diction in Pennsylvania); see also Robinson v. Bartlow, No. 3:12-CV-00024, 2012 WL
4718656 (W.D. Va. Oct. 3, 2012) (finding personal jurisdiction over a start-up company for
patent infringement in Virginia because the company shipped eight products to the state and
operated an interactive website that was accessible to Virginia residents).
126. Bryant, supra note 7, at 689.
127. Id.
128. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
129. 35 U.S.C. § 299(a) (2011).
130. Id.
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cases.'"' With § 299, Congress effectively prohibited the practice of joining
defendants based solely on the alleged infringement of the same patents.
Thus far, § 299 has largely succeeded in bringing uniformity to the join-
der standard in patent litigation. In Phoenix Licensing v. Aetna, the Eastern
District of Texas determined that, in light of § 299, a patentee cannot join
multiple defendants based solely on alleged infringement of common pat-
ents.13 2 In Phoenix, an NPE named over forty alleged infringers of business
method and software patents.'33 The court determined that joining the de-
fendants was not appropriate because the "AIA clearly requires an additional
party to have sufficient facts in common with all defendants beyond sole
allegations of patent infringement. . . . Section 299(b) clearly states that the
common question of fact must extend beyond the allegations of patent
infringement."I 34
Small businesses that only sell or use accused products have a further
advantage under the new joinder provision. Under § 299, courts have found
that sales at different points in the stream of commerce represent separate
transactions; for example, retailers cannot be joined with manufacturers just
for selling the same accused products. 35 In one case, Digitech Image Tech-
nologies, an NPE that held patents related to digital image technology at-
tempted to join over forty camera retailers and manufacturers in the Central
District of California.'3 6 Digitech argued that its claims arose from a single
series of transactions because the camera retailers all sold infringing prod-
ucts from the same manufacturers. The court rejected this argument, finding
that separate sales of the same accused product constitute separate
transactions.3 7
Likewise, in Mednovus v. QinetiQ, the court found that joinder was not
appropriate for alleged infringers who sold different products.'13 In
Mednovus, the patentee joined a product manufacturer with two of its dis-
tributors.'39 While the retail defendants sold largely different products, the
patentee alleged that there was some overlap.' 4" The court stated that "Plain-
131. H.R. REP,. No. 112-98, at 55 n.61 (2011).
132. Phoenix Licensing, LLC v. Aetna, Inc., No. 2:11 -CV-285-JRG, 2012 WL 3472973,
at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2012).
133. Docket, Phoenix Licensing, 2012 WL 3472973.
134. Phoenix Licensing, 2012 WL 3472973, at *1-2.
135. Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Agfaphoto Holding GMBH, No. 8:12-CV-l 153-
ODW, 2012 WL 4513805 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2012); Mednovus, Inc. v. QinetiQ Grp. PLC, No.
2:12-CV-03487-ODW, 2012 WL 4513539 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2012).
136. Docket, Digitech, 2012 WL 4513805.
137. Digitech, 2012 WL 4513805, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2012) ("For instance, when
Leica sells a pallet of infringing digital cameras to Best Buy, that is one transaction. When
Leica sells a second pallet of the same cameras to Target, that is a second transaction. These
two sales have nothing to do with each other-other than involving the same camera model.").
138. Mednovus, 2012 WL 4513539, at *3.
139. Id. at *1.
140. Id. at *2.
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tiffs' allegations that each Defendant infringed on a different set of products
fails § 299(a)(1)'s requirement that Plaintiffs right to relief arise out of pro-
ducing or selling the same accused product."'41 Additionally, the court
found that even if the defendants sold the same product, the sale between the
manufacturer and the distributor and the sale between the distributor and the
end-user would not constitute the same transaction or occurrence.142
Conversely, courts have allowed joinder under § 299 if the alleged in-
fringers have a close working relationship related to the same accused prod-
uct. In Omega Patents v. Skypatrol, the court denied a motion to sever a
distributor of vehicle tracking technology from its manufacturer.143 One of
the alleged infringers, Enfora, produced vehicle-tracking technology that
was sold to a distributor.'" Upon receiving such technology, the distributor
"reconfigures, modifies, and rebrands the same product-using information
and documentation provided by Enfora-for distribution under its own
name." 45 The court found that in this case, joinder was appropriate given the
close working relationship between the manufacturer and the distributor,
which constituted a single series of transactions and gave rise to common
questions of fact.146
In practice, § 299 forces NPEs to litigate against most small companies
in separate trials. While Omega Patents indicates that courts will still join
companies with a close working relationship,147 the AIA prohibits courts
from joining large numbers of defendants based solely on commonly in-
fringed patents or the sale of similar products. As a result, NPEs will ulti-
mately face higher costs when asserting patents against small companies.148
Furthermore, it will be more difficult for NPEs to prevent small businesses
from transferring cases out of patentee-friendly jurisdictions because indi-
vidual defendants, especially small business defendants with offices in a sin-
gle location, will be able to show a more convenient venue for trial.149
IV. THE NPE RESPONSE TO § 299
Critics of § 299 argue that it will have a minimal impact on NPE activ-
ity because patent holders can circumvent the new limitation on joinder
through the International Trade Commission ("ITC") and Multi-District Liti-
141. Id.
142. Id. at *3.
143. Omega Patents, LLC v. Skypatrol, LLC, No. 1:11 -CV-24201-KMM, 2012 WL
2339320, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 19, 2012).
144. Id. at *1-2.
145. Id. at *2.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Cf Bryant, supra note 7, at 688-89 (explaining that joining multiple defendants
reduces litigation costs).
149. See id. at 689.
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gation ("MDL").5 'o These studies, however, neglect to consider how the
joinder provision may affect the distributional impact of NPE assertions.
First, it is true that NPEs will likely file more complaints against alleged
infringers in the ITC, which is not subject to the AIA's joinder provisions.' 5 '
On the other hand, NPEs that assert patents against small companies are less
likely to turn to the ITC because users and distributors of technology can
usually switch to substitute products if an NPE obtains an exclusionary or-
der.152 Second, NPEs may consolidate cases by centralizing pretrial proceed-
ings through MDL. 53 Yet this tactic will offer very limited benefits to NPEs
that assert patents against large numbers of small businesses, since the NPE
will still need to try each case separately, often in different jurisdictions.
A. Turning to the ITC
The ITC is an independent administrative agency that investigates alle-
gations of unfair trade practices and exercises in rem jurisdiction over all
products imported into the U.S.15 4 Additionally, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 gives the
ITC authority to exclude importation of any articles that infringe a valid U.S.
patent.'" Since the Supreme Court outlined the four-part test for injunctions
in patent cases in eBay v. MercExchange,' 5 6 the ITC has become an increas-
ingly popular venue for NPE patent litigation. Unlike district courts, the ITC
is not subject to the eBay holding and may prohibit importation of infringing
products without undertaking the test for a permanent injunction.5 7 Addi-
150. See, e.g., Quinn Emmanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Multi-Defendant Joinder
Under the America Invents Act: Much Ado About Nothing?, JD SUrRA (Dec. 20, 2012), http://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/multi-defendant-joinder-under-the-americ-97136/.
151. Daniel E. Yonan et al., AIA Effects on Parallel Section 337 Practice-Joinder
Under the AIA, in 2 PATENT OFince LrIIGATION § 17:14 (Robert Greene Sterne et al. eds.,
2012).
152. An exclusionary order bans importation of the infringing product into the United
States. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2011).
153. See, e.g., In re Bear Creek Techs., Inc., ('722) Patent Litig., MDL 2344, 2012 WL
1523340 (May 2, 2012).
154. William Dolan, Note, The International Trade Commission: Potential Bias, Hold-
Up, and the Need for Reform, 2009 DUKE L. & TECH. Riv. I1, at *1-2, http://scholar-
ship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l 195&context=dltr.
155. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2011) ("If the Commission determines . . . that there is a
violation of this section, it shall direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person
violating the provision of this section, be excluded from entry into the United States . . . .");
accord id. § 1337(a)(1) (defining the importation of a product that infringes a valid and en-
forceable U.S. patent as a violation of this section).
156. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) ("According to well-
established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-
factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.").
157. Dolan, supra note 154, at *1.
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tionally, the AIA joinder provision does not apply to the ITC because ITC
investigations are not civil actions under Title 35 of the United States
Code.'15 Multi-defendant litigation at the ITC remains common and will
likely increase in the years following the implementation of the AIA. While
there are no empirical studies on the size of respondents at the ITC, one
study of ITC complaints from 1995 to 2007 found that 57% of domestic
respondents were publicly traded companies,'15 suggesting that most respon-
dents are larger companies.
Despite the ability to join multiple defendants, NPEs are not likely to
hale small businesses into the ITC. Unlike district courts, the ITC cannot
grant damages.o60 Instead, NPEs use the ITC to engage in patent hold-up,' 6'
a strategy characterized by using the threat of an injunction to drive up roy-
alty rates.162 Patent hold-up strategy is particularly effective against compa-
nies that have made significant investments into designing, manufacturing,
and marketing a product.163 NPEs will allege that one component of the
product has infringed a patent.'" The allegedly infringing component is
often a small portion of the overall product, but it may be vital to the prod-
uct's operation.165 Faced with an ITC exclusionary order, a producer has
several options: (1) stop importing the infringing product, which may mean
losing investments in research and development ("R&D") and overseas pro-
duction capacity; (2) redesign the infringing product, which often involves
more R&D money and may not even be feasible; or (3) negotiate for a li-
cense.166 Therefore, even if the patent is not valuable by itself, the alleged
infringer will often pay a high license rate to avoid an exclusionary order,''
and NPEs rely on this dynamic to obtain high royalty rates from producers.
By comparison, few small companies have made extensive R&D invest-
ments in any particular product. Downstream sellers and users of technology
158. Thomas Martin, The International Trade Commission-A More Desirable Venue
For Patent Infringement Actions In The Wake Of The America Invents Act, 10 BAKER Boi-is
INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY REPORT 2 (2013), available at http://www.bakerbotts.com/file-up
load/IPReport2O1302-ThelntemationalTradeCommission.htm ("Section 299 applies only to
'civil actions', which are heard by Article III, or judicial, tribunals. By contrast, the ITC is an
Article 1, or legislative, tribunal that hears only those actions enumerated by Congress in the
Tariff Act.").
159. Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at
the International Trade Commission, 50 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 63, 92 (2008).
160. Dolan, supra note 154, at *11, *19.
161. Id. at *18.
162. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx.
L. Riv. 1991, 2000 (2007) (describing how patent hold-up tactics result in a royalty over-
charge); accord Dolan, supra note 154, at *11, *22 (describing the patent hold-up tactics at the
ITC).
163. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 162, at 1992-93.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Dolan, supra note 154, at *19-22.
167. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 162, at 1992-93.
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can usually switch to substitute products if an NPE obtains an exclusionary
order against an infringing component. As stated in Section III, Project
Paperless is an NPE that sent demand letters to small businesses for using
certain digital scanners.168 Suppose that Project Paperless threatened defend-
ants with an exclusionary order from the ITC, instead of a lawsuit in district
court. If the ITC then granted an exclusionary order over the accused scan-
ners, it would have effectively prohibited Xerox, Canon, and other manufac-
turers from importing their scanners, dealing a significant blow to these
companies. Conversely, small businesses that use scanners in their daily bus-
iness would not be liable for damages and could continue to use the technol-
ogy or purchase non-infringing scanners as necessary. In this scenario, few
small businesses would likely be willing to negotiate with an NPE to remove
an exclusionary order, thus limiting the ITC's utility to NPEs.
B. Pretrial Centralization Through Multi-District Litigation
Some commentators have also suggested that the availability of MDL
will minimize the impact of 35 U.S.C. § 299.169 MDL is governed by 28
U.S.C. § 1407, which states that "[w]hen civil actions involving one or more
common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may
be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial pro-
ceedings."o711 For patent cases, common questions such as claim construction
may be consolidated through MDL.1'7
The Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation ("JPML") determines
transfers in MDL. The JPML consists of seven federal judges selected by the
Chief Justice of the U.S. and has the responsibility of selecting cases with
common questions of fact that are pending in different districts for pretrial
consolidation.17 2 The pretrial proceedings are transferred to a single district
court selected by the JPML."3 In theory, after pretrial proceedings are com-
plete, the transferee court will remand the cases to the transferor district
courts for trial. 7 4 In practice, the majority of cases will be disposed of by
settlement or a judgment on a dispositive motion before the cases are
remanded."'
168. Michael Rundle, Project Paperless: American 'Patent Troll' Demands $1,000 Per
User of Scanners, HUlINGTON PosT UK (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/
2013/ 01/03/project-paperless-scanner- 1000-dollars_n_2401204.html.
169. Quinn Emmanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, supra note 150.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2011) (emphasis added).
171. In re Mailblocks, Inc., Patent Litig., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2003).
172. Id.
173. Daniel A. Richards, An Analysis of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation's
Selection of Transferee District and Judge, 78 FORDHAm L. Rv. 311, 317 (2009) (finding that
only 20% of cases are remanded to the original transferor districts).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Unlike the standard for joinder, the standard for centralization does not
require a common transaction or occurrence.'7 6 Rather, centralization is ap-
propriate if the different cases share common questions of fact, for which
commonly infringed patents will suffice.'77 In a case involving several al-
leged infringers of a pharmaceutical patent, the JPML found that, because all
of the pretrial matters involved a single patent, "[c]entralization under Sec-
tion 1407 [was] thus necessary in order to eliminate duplicative discovery,
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, and conserve the resources of the par-
ties, their counsel and the judiciary." 7"
The JPML has explicitly stated that the AIA joinder provision does not
apply to centralization under § 1407.179 In Bear Creek Technologies, which
involved a patent for Voice over Internet Protocol technology, the patentee
moved to consolidate multiple alleged infringers-including many of the
major telecommunications companies-through MDL.'"0 One of the alleged
infringers, Vonage, argued that the new provision of the AIA prevents the
JPML from centralizing the cases."' The JPML found that "the America
Invents Act [did] not alter [its] authority to order pretrial centralization of
this litigation."8 2 The panel went on to note that transfer under § 1407 and
joinder under § 299 have always operated under different standards, and
there is no overlap between the two sections because § 299 is focused on
consolidation for trial while § 1407 only encompasses pretrial proceed-
ings. 183 Finally, the JPML stated that "if Congress intended to amend Section
1407 it would have done so in a more direct fashion than Vonage now advo-
cates.""' 4 Likewise, in Body Science, the JPML centralized five separate in-
fringement actions over the opposition of the defendants.' 5 Although the
defendants manufactured different products, the JPML found that centraliza-
tion would "allow a single judge-as opposed to the now five judges in five
districts-to preside over discovery relating to the two patents at issue . . .
and to consistently rule on challenges to the validity of those patents.""' 6
While it is conceivable for NPEs to centralize cases against small busi-
nesses through MDL, it will likely remain a tool for use against larger corpo-
rations. As the JPML stated in Bear Creek, the key feature of MDL-and
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2011); In re Bear Creek Techs., Inc., ('722) Patent Litig., 858 F.
Supp. 2d 1375, 1378-79 (J.P.M.L 2012).
177. Id.
178. In re Mirtazapine Patent Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1380, 1381 (J.P.M.L. 2002).
179. Bear Creek, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 1378-79.
180. Id. at 1376.
181. Id. at 1377-79.
182. Id. at 1378.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. In re Body Sci. LLC Patent Litig., MDL No. 2375, 883 F. Supp. 2d 1344, at 1345
(J.P.M.L. 2012).
186. Id. at *1.
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the reason why it is not subject to the AIA joinder provisions-is that it only
consolidates pretrial proceedings." After the transferee court has completed
pretrial proceedings, any remaining proceedings are remanded to the original
jurisdictions"8 MDL allows NPEs to establish patent validity and claim
construction at a single venue. This will reduce the risk of estoppel as well
as limit discovery and the cost of pretrial proceedings. However, NPEs will
still need to try the case against each individual defendant once the trans-
feree court remands the cases to their original jurisdictions. For NPEs that
assert patents against hundreds of small businesses, litigating against every
alleged infringer will require a litany of trials across the country, and the
cost of enforcing their patents may deter NPEs from suing small busi-
nesses.'"' Additionally, the patentee cannot dictate the forum for pretrial pro-
ceedings in MDL,"90 which represents a further disadvantage for NPEs.
While NPEs have been quick to adapt to changes in the law in the past,
there does not appear to be any easy procedural way for NPEs to join large
numbers of small companies at the present time. As such, the joinder provi-
sion will likely shift NPE litigation away from small businesses, potentially
reducing the negative social impact of patent litigation.
V. SMALL BUSINESSES AS PAWNS: THE PROBLEM OF ROYALTY PADDING
The previous sections highlight how § 299 of the AIA will likely reduce
the number of NPE lawsuits against small businesses. While it is unclear
whether § 299 will reduce the aggregate impact of NPEs as Congress in-
tended, it certainly limits NPEs' ability to achieve a profitable economy of
scale against small businesses. Some NPEs, however, may still target small
businesses to validate their patents and drive up the royalty rate of licenses
in order to pursue larger companies."' This strategy, sometimes known as
"royalty padding," involves suing small defendants first and settling the law-
suits through licenses that carry low dollar amounts but represent high roy-
alty rates.192 Subsequently, the NPE will target a large company and
introduce the previous royalty rate as evidence to drive up the damage
award. To discourage this tactic, the courts and Congress should discourage
the use of licenses reached under the threat of litigation to demonstrate the
reasonable royalty rate.
187. Bear Creek, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 1378-79.
188. Id.
189. Banowit et al., supra note 94, § 17:14.
190. See, e.g., Body Sci., 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1346.
191. Startups, supra note 4, at 5; Kuhl, supra note 89, at 273 ("Prior licenses can also
provide evidence of nonobviousness to support a claim of validity.").
192. Startups, supra note 4, at 5.
Spring 2013] 511
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 19:489
In patent infringement cases, the most common method of finding dam-
ages is by determining a reasonable royalty rate for the patent. 93 In Georgia-
Pacific v. U.S. Plywood, the court outlined twelve factors used to determine
a reasonable royalty rate for a patent license.19 4 The most important factor is
the royalty rate "received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in
suit,""5 or in other words, previous licenses of the same patent. In most
jurisdictions, prior licenses are only admissible if they are reached through
an arms-length transaction, without the threat of litigation." 6 A 2010 case in
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, however, raised doubts regarding this
rule." In ResQNet v. Lansa, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals found that
litigation-induced licenses can be more probative of the reasonable royalty
rate than non-litigation-induced licenses.198 Subsequent courts have read this
to mean that litigation-induced licenses are no longer precluded from evi-
dence,199 opening the door for NPEs to use these licenses to demonstrate a
reasonable royalty rate.
While litigation-induced licenses may be probative, courts need to ac-
count for the relative bargaining positions of the parties that negotiated the
previous license. Licenses between NPEs and small companies, reached af-
ter a demand letter or other threat of litigation, are likely the result of une-
qual bargaining positions and should not be used to determine future royalty
rates. This rule would help remove the incentive to target small businesses
merely to validate the patent or drive up subsequent royalty rates.
193. Patent Litigation Study, supra note 22, at II (finding that reasonable royalty rate is
used to determine damages in 81.9% of cases).
194. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electronics Am., Inc., 860 F. Supp. 1448,
1452 (C.D. Cal. 1993) ("It is a century-old rule that royalties paid to avoid litigation are not a
reliable indicator of the value of a patent, and should therefore be disregarded when determin-
ing reasonable royalty rates. This is because royalties paid under threat of suit may reflect the
licensee's desire to avoid the risk and expense of litigation.").
197. See ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 872-73 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
198. The court compared litigation-induced licenses that only involved the claimed in-
vention with non-litigation-induced licenses that conveyed broader rights than the asserted
patents and concluded that the litigation-induced licenses were a better measure of reasonable
royalty. Id.
199. See, e.g., Tyco Healthcare Group LP v. E-Z-EM, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-262, 2010 WL
774878, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2010) ("The Federal Circuit has explained that prior license
agreements that result from litigation can be the 'most reliable' to the hypothetical negotiation
damages analysis .... ).
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CONCLUSION
In the wake of the financial crisis and the 2008 recession, many in Con-
gress have promoted a policy of small business growth. 2(*I There is a percep-
tion that legal and compliance costs inhibit business development, and the
federal government has responded with deregulation. 2111 While deregulation
may play a role in small business growth, Congress and the courts should
also address problems in the litigation system that create incentives to target
small businesses because of their financial and operational vulnerabilities.
In the past decade, there have been many proposals for patent reforms
aimed at reducing overall NPE activity. Examples include establishing an
independent invention defense and fee shifting in patent litigation cases.2012
This author cautions against reforms that would systematically impose
higher burdens on patentees. NPEs represent a broad group of patent hold-
ers, including both independent inventors and universities. Likewise, the pat-
ent portfolios of both large and small companies represent their ingenuity
and investment. In a speech at the Eastern District of Texas Judicial Confer-
ence, Chief Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals cautioned
against focusing on patent trolls at the expense of "patent grasshoppers,"
which he described as "the entity that is quick to steal the 'inventor-ant's'
work and research investment because he did no work himself and the win-
ter of competition approaches. We can recognize the grasshopper because he
refuses to pay any license fee until his legs and claws are held to the prover-
bial litigation fire."203 As discussed in Section I, enforcing a patent through
litigation is already a multi-million dollar undertaking for patent holders. 204
If courts impose a higher burden on patent holders, such as by shifting legal
fees if their patents are invalidated, 205 then it will become even more difficult
for inventors to capitalize on their ingenuity.
Rather than reforming patent law at the expense of all patent holders,
Congress and the courts should craft policies that distinguish between paten-
tees attempting to realize the value of their innovation, and groups that use
200. Sam Graves, Small Businesses Drive Job Creation, Growth, THE Hiui, (July 11,
2012, 6:01 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/237433-small-busi
nesses-drive-job-creation-growth.
201. See, e.g., Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (deregulating securities for businesses with annual revenues under $1 billion).
202. See, e.g., Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringe-
ment, 105 MicH. L. Riw. 475 (2006); Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better
Patent System, 17 BERKEIEY TECH. L.J. 763, 787 (2002) ("The final strategy is to create a one-
way, pro-defendant, fee-shifting system if patent claims are invalidated or revoked in a litiga-
tion or opposition proceeding based on certain categories of prior art that are reasonably likely
to be discovered by a diligent patentee.").
203. Hon. Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, Fed. Cir., Address at the E.D. Texas Judicial
Conference: The State of Patent Litigation, at 17-18 (Sept. 7, 2011) (transcript available at
http://www.patentlyo.com/files/raderstateofpatentlit.pdf).
204. Risch, supra note 25, at 467.
205. Kesan, supra note 202, at 787.
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patent litigation as a predatory tactic to extract value from vulnerable parties.
Section 299 takes a step in the right direction by making it more difficult for
NPEs to exploit economies of scale to assert patents against small
businesses.
